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International Fisheries Governance that Works:
The Case for a Global Fisheries Organization
by J. Samuel Barkin and Elizabeth R. DeSombre

“There are three major functions
that a global fisheries organization
can usefully perform to generate
effective global governance of
international fisheries. In order
of increasing ambition, these
are: 1) the coordination and
oversight of the existing network
of RFMO management,
2) the generation of international
cooperation on limiting and,
ultimately, eliminating subsidization of the fishing industry, and
3) the creation of a system of
international individual
transferable quotas (ITQs).”

International fisheries are being overexploited, and the current institutional structure in place
to manage them is not working effectively. Presently, two sets of intergovernmental institutions
oversee global fishing. The first comprises roughly three dozen regional fisheries management
organizations (RFMOs), approximately 19 of which are charged with regulating fishing in the
areas they oversee. The second set consists of global organizations that touch on but do not directly regulate fisheries issues, such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). This management patchwork is inadequate to the task, and needs to be
supplemented by a new global fisheries organization. Such an organization would most usefully
serve three core functions:
Coordinating the various existing institutional participants in international fisheries
governance;
Addressing the crisis of overcapitalization and overcapacity in the fishing industry driven
by widespread government subsidies;
Overseeing a system of international individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
This policy brief outlines the nature of the problem and discusses these three functions in
greater depth.1

International Fisheries
By some measures, more than three-quarters of commercial fish stocks are either fully exploited or overexploited.2 Total global catch reached a plateau of between 80 and 90 million
tonnes per year in the mid-1980s and has remained there ever since.3 Meanwhile, the effort
to catch the same amount of fish is increasing. While some (but far from all) well-managed
fisheries in developed countries show signs of recovery from unsustainable fishing practices, the same is not true of international fisheries.4

Figure 1: World Marine Fish Catches
Statistics from Food and Agriculture Organization, Fisheries and Aquaculture
Department, “Fishery Statistics,” Global Capture Production, 1950–2008,
www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/en (date visited: August 6, 2011).
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Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

International fisheries are those that reside entirely in international waters, outside of national exclusive economic zones
(EEZs); that straddle EEZ borders; or that involve highly migratory species, which move across international waters and
different EEZs. Individual countries cannot effectively regulate
and manage such fisheries. These fisheries are often referred
to as common pool resources, meaning that while everyone
collectively might recognize a common interest in sustainable
management of the resource, countries have an individual incentive to overfish because the benefits of restraint are likely
to be undermined by overfishing by others.5 Effective management of international fisheries therefore requires effective coordination and meaningful enforcement mechanisms.

While some of the RFMOs are able to limit overexploitation
of some specific stocks, they are unable to effectively manage
international fisheries as a whole. There are two reasons why
RFMOs are so limited. The first is that they are, by design, regional, whereas the problem is global. The second is that they
only regulate fishing effort; they are not designed to address
the key problem in the political economy of contemporary international fisheries management: the fact that the industry is
simply too big.
Individual RFMOs regulate either specific geographical regions, as is the case with the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the Commission for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), or specific fish
species within broader regions, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (IOTC). The territories of these different kinds of
RFMOs sometimes overlap, although their jurisdiction over
specific species does not. This division of responsibilities for
the most part makes sense from a traditional fisheries management perspective, because it generally mirrors the location of
specific fish stocks (see Figure 1).

The current structure of global fisheries management, however,
fails to provide either central coordination or meaningful enforcement mechanisms. The global institutions involved in the
process do not generate authoritative fishing regulation. The
IMO oversees safety of fishing vessels but has no role in determining what they can catch or how. The other global institutions
either gather information and provide management advice, as in
the case of the FAO and the World Bank, or attempt but are unable to create hard law mechanisms, as in the case of the WTO.
They create no rules to enforce, and their efforts overlap and lack
centralized coordination. Responsibility for effective regulation
is thus left entirely to the regional organizations, RFMOs.

Figure 2 Map of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
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Regulation is thus based on where the fish are, rather than
where the fishers are. Those who have the technology to catch
fish in international fisheries, however, generally have the ability to fish across RFMO boundaries, and many have the ability to
move globally in search of fish stocks. This creates a geographic
mismatch between the regulatory mechanism, RFMOs, and the
ultimate object of regulation, fishers. Regulating specific species in specific locations can relieve the pressure of overexploitation on a given stock, but the fishers involved can simply fish
elsewhere, putting additional pressure on other stocks.

institution that is both global in nature and designed specifically to address the problem of overcapacity in the industry. This
institution, a global fisheries organization (GFO), would ideally be a new, rather than a repurposed version of an existing,
organization. The creation of this new organization would not
require universal participation, or even initial participation by
all members of existing RFMOs, as long as those states that are
the major markets for imported fish are involved. Once the participation of those countries is assured, members can require
participation in the new global process from countries from
which they import fish products. This kind of market power
has already proved effective at increasing membership and participation (even from flag-of-convenience states) in regulatory
processes within individual RFMOs.7 Organized in a systematic
way by a GFO, it could prove even more so.

The second problem with RFMO regulation, therefore, is that
even when it generates quotas on specific catches, it does not
address total fishing capacity. There are simply more vessels
and people in the industry than the global stock of fish can support. When an individual RFMO tightens regulation of a specific
fishery, that fishery can then support fewer fishers. But fishers
have investments in equipment and skills, and can often draw
on subsidies if they continue fishing. If they are forced out of
a specific fishery by increased regulation, they are likely to try
to find somewhere else to fish, rather than to stop fishing altogether. In other words, tighter regulation of a specific fishery is
likely to lead to fishers looking for new fisheries, and therefore
to increased pressure on other stocks. This phenomenon can
be thought of as a balloon problem—squeeze fishing capacity
in one place and it bulges out elsewhere, where regulation is
weakest. Even in the unlikely event that all RFMOs manage to
tighten regulation at the same pace, the excess capacity displaced by increased regulation will likely find regulatory gaps
in the system—fish species not yet regulated or areas without
regulatory RFMOs—and exploit those gaps.

There are three major functions that a GFO can usefully perform to generate effective global governance of international
fisheries. In order of increasing ambition, these are: 1) the
coordination and oversight of the existing network of RFMO
management, 2) the generation of international cooperation
on limiting and, ultimately, eliminating subsidization of the
fishing industry, and 3) the creation of a system of international
individual transferable quotas (ITQs).

Coordination and Oversight
Managing the complete set of RFMOs as a single system lies
at the core of a Global Fisheries Organization’s responsibilities.
Coordination involves tracking the overlap and gaps of RFMO
coverage to minimize the space for regulatory arbitrage by the
industry. When the balloon effect puts new pressure on a previously underexploited species, there will be an institution in
place to address the problem and work toward a cooperative
response. Oversight involves making sure that all RFMOs are
working effectively and have compatible approaches and standards. While there is currently some cooperation and communication of best practices among RFMOs, it does not happen
systematically, and the RFMOs are not properly resourced for
it. A GFO will make sure that the benefits of cooperation and
oversight accrue to all RFMOs and result in fewer gaps in the
system.

RFMOs are institutionally poorly equipped to address the balloon problem. They are designed to address the practices of an
existing fishing industry, not to address the size of that industry. In current governance practice, the size of national fleets
is a matter of national concern, and international regulation
affects only those portions of national fleets that governments
allow to exploit international fisheries. Beyond the fact that the
global problem of overcapacity in the fishing industry is not addressed, this two-level model of governance is further undermined by the fact that individual vessel owners can choose to
register their ships in countries that do not participate in RFMO
governance. These countries, called flags of convenience, are
major obstacles to effective governance of international fisheries.6 Ultimately, governance of international fisheries is a global
problem that needs a global solution. Attempts to improve cooperation among RFMOs or to scale them up do not change the
fact that they are inherently regional mechanisms.

Coordination and oversight by a single GFO should make the
system of RFMOs work both more efficiently and more effectively. But it will not address the central problem of the system,
that of excess capacity in the industry. The other two functions
that a GFO can perform—reducing subsidies and creating international ITQs—will address the excess capacity issue directly.

Rationale for a Global Fisheries Organization

Subsidies Reduction and Elimination

One way to generate a global solution is to address the management of international fisheries through an intergovernmental

The global fishing industry is heavily subsidized. By some estimates, as much as one-quarter of total industry revenue comes
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from subsidies.8 Subsidization makes the global fishing fleet
significantly larger than it would otherwise be: larger than both
existing fish stocks and the global market for fish can support.
Governments, in other words, put money into creating more
fishing capacity while working (through RFMOs and other
regulatory processes) to reduce the amount of fish that can be
caught. These two activities work at cross-purposes: governments are both wasting money and undermining their own
fisheries management efforts. Cooperative efforts to reduce
subsidies can save governments money and improve international fisheries governance without generating the sort of competitive disadvantages that unilateral reduction in subsidies
might create.

to host the negotiations necessary to put the system together
and make it work. Furthermore, the creation of such a system
is unlikely without a GFO, both global in scope and focused on
fisheries management, to shepherd the process through negotiations to implementation. And if implemented effectively,
a global ITQ system has the potential to solve the problem of
overcapacity, and therefore the balloon problem, in international fisheries in a way that is simply not possible under the
current RFMO-based system.

Getting to a GFO
The current network of RFMOs would nonetheless remain a
necessary component of a system of global governance of fisheries with a GFO at its center. RFMOs have enormous expertise, both scientific and managerial, about specific fisheries.
Replicating that expertise in one organization is unnecessary,
and expecting it to maintain a simultaneous focus on all international fisheries is unrealistic. An international ITQ system
would be built on individual species and fishing quotas, and
these quotas would continue to come from the existing RFMO
network, building on the experience and technical expertise
that these organizations have at their disposal. The RFMO
network is not particularly relevant to the subsidies-reduction
function of a GFO, although a meaningful agreement to reduce
subsidies would make the job of RFMOs easier and their management more effective. The coordination and oversight function assumes the continued existence of the network. And the
ITQ function would work best if it is built on, rather than replacing, an RFMO network that has been made more effective
by the coordination and oversight function.11

There have been a number of efforts by global intergovernmental institutions to generate negotiated reductions in fisheries
subsidies, including the WTO, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Conference of
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).9
But none has succeeded. A GFO, where fisheries management
efforts would not be subordinate to other institutional goals,
would be a more effective vehicle for hosting negotiations to
reduce, and ultimately eliminate, subsidies.

International Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)
Reducing subsidies would allow market signals about overcapacity to reach the industry, which would help to address the
problem. But market signals by themselves are insufficient as
long as fisheries are a common pool resource. Effective management requires controlling the open-access aspect of fisheries. One of the management techniques that has proved most
effective at the domestic level is the use of ITQs. Each ITQ is a
specific proportion of the total allowable catch for a particular species or fishery. A comprehensive ITQ system, by requiring all fishers to hold quota in order to catch fish, will limit
the overall amount of fishing capacity that can access global
stocks. ITQs are generally owned by specific fishers or fishing
companies, giving them a long-term interest in the health of
that specific fishery and thus an interest in sound management
over time. ITQs can also be sold to other fishers. The trade of
ITQs increases the interest in the long-term condition of the
fishery—an ITQ in a healthy fishery will be worth more than in
an ailing one. Studies suggest that ITQ systems, while not perfect, are on average far more effective at maintaining healthy
fisheries than other management systems.10

The plan sketched here for a GFO is an ambitious one, and this
proposal does not operate under the illusion that implementing the plan in all of its parts will be easy. In response to the
observation that the proposed plan of action is a difficult one,
we make two arguments. The first is that each of the three functions listed here can stand on its own. A GFO effective at all
three functions will revolutionize global fisheries governance.
Even if a GFO is effective at only two of the three, it will still have
a major impact on fisheries governance. And with progress on
any one of the functions, global fisheries governance will be
more effective than is currently the case, and the new organization will be a success. The second is that if no one makes the
case for a GFO, it has no chance of becoming a reality.
There are certainly many political obstacles to the creation of
a GFO. The difficulty of its creation should not, however, dissuade policymakers from putting the issue on the international
governance agenda. The point of this policy brief is to do just
that—to start a conversation about a GFO, and to begin to
identify a political coalition that can effectively promote it as
the best solution to the structural weakness of the current system of global fisheries governance.

ITQs have never been tried at the international level. Implementing them at this level would require both an institution to
centrally manage the global trade in ITQs, and an intergovernmental agreement to enforce an ITQ system by preventing the
importation of fish caught in international fisheries outside the
system. A GFO would be well placed both to manage the mechanics of a global ITQ system for international fisheries, and
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